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CSR, audit quality and firm performance during COVID-19: an organizational legitimacy 
perspective 
Abstract 
Purpose - COVID-19 induced uncertainty in the firms’ business transactions, product-market 
competition and financial market cause severe organizational legitimacy crisis. Using the 
organizational legitimacy perspective, we study the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) activities, audit quality, and firm performance. 
Design/methodology/approach – We use a quarterly panel of 89,185 firm observations (15,955 
unique firms) from 131 countries from July 2018 to December 2020 for 10 quarters. We use a 
Difference-in-Difference (DiD) method to estimate the effect of CSR activities and audit quality 
on firm performance during the COVID-19 period. 
Findings - We find a U-shaped relationship between CSR and firm performance. This relationship 
is strengthened during COVID-19. In contrast, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
firm audit quality (audit fee) and firm performance. However, this relationship is weakened during 
the pandemic. 
Originality/value – Our study makes important contributions to theory and practice on 
maintaining organizational legitimacy during the pandemic. During the crisis, managers need to 
focus on strategies increasing firm value for the time period. This study shows that firms’ temporal 
legitimacy gaining practices such as CSR activities and audit quality provides an opportunity to 
increase firm value. Firm managers also need to identify the optimal level of CSR activities and 
audit fees to balance the cost of agency and the benefits of legitimacy. 
Keywords CSR, audit quality, COVID-19, firm performance, organizational legitimacy  
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1. Introduction 
COVID-19 led to unprecedented uncertainty in the economy (Altig et al., 2020). It resulted in a 
global economic crisis and a sharp decline in stock markets worldwide (Szczygielski et al., 2021). 
On one hand, social distancing norms and strict lockdowns were imposed to reduce the spread of 
the virus (Caulkins et al., 2020). On the other hand, these stringent measures resulted in reduced 
economic activity for the firms. Many firms followed a simple strategy of cutting down the 
expenses and crouch it till the storm passes in response to the declining sales and uncertainty over 
this period (Boissay et al., 2020). The pandemic has resulted in increased attention to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities (Bae et al., 2021). The firms are involved in creating and 
increasing shareholder value by repeating their commitments to stakeholder interests. Any failure 
in responding to such commitments would adversely impact the business environment for firms 
(Manuel and Herron, 2020). Moreover, it can adversely impact investors' confidence that can result 
in financial distress. Furthermore, given the high risk of distress during COVID-19, it is likely that 
the firms violate the debt contracts (Albitar et al., 2020), and follow earning smoothing practices. 
This increased demands in assurance for investors to increase their confidence through audit 
quality (Arthur et al., 2015) as well as increased CSR activities. In light of the risk caused by the 
pandemic, we study the impact of CSR activities and audit quality on firm performance during 
COVID-19.   
 We integrate the institutional (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) and strategic 
(Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995) theories of organizational legitimacy to propose a 
theoretical model. First, we argue that up to an extent, the shareholders perceive CSR efforts as 
firms’ conformity to societal norms at their cost. The firms merely engage in CSR practices to 
show a certain level of compliance with social and environmental outcomes (Deegan, 2002; 
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Waddock, 2004). We further argue that beyond an extent, the CSR decisions are based on an 
organizational strategic legitimacy perspective rather than complying with institutional norms. The 
rational firm managers take these extensive CSR decisions to increase form profit or increase the 
firm value. Hence, we hypothesize a U-shaped relationship between CSR activities and firm 
performance. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic is a truly exogenous event that led to a high 
level of uncertainty and an unprecedented stock market crash within a relatively short period. The 
firms are under the spotlight due to the sudden increase in market participants and the increased 
focus of government bodies on CSR activities during the pandemic. The firms with higher CSR 
activities with limited financial and human resources during the pandemic are perceived more 
legitimate and valued higher by shareholders. Hence, we hypothesize that the U-shaped 
relationship between CSR activities and firm performance is strengthened during COVID-19. 
 Second, audit fees show the firms’ audit quality and audit cost. Firms use higher audit fees 
as a strategic instrument to reflect audit quality by using specialized audit staff and more audit 
hours (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002), and signals that firms have hired big auditors with more 
skill, expertise, and experience. This enhances the legitimacy of a firm's disclosure and reporting 
to increase firm value. Further, we argue that audit fees beyond a level may negatively influence 
firm value. As per auditing pricing theory and literature on abnormally high audit fees, a very high 
audit fee reflects firm business risks (Asthana & Boone, 2012; Choi et al., 2010). A very high audit 
fee also shows agency relationship between firm’s managers and auditing firm, which, in turn, 
reduces auditor independence. Hence, we hypothesize an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
audit quality (or audit fee) and firm performance. Prior literature suggests that economic crises 
negatively impact firm accounting management and reporting practices (Huizinga and Laeven, 
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2012, 2012; Peterson and Arun, 2018). This makes the role of firm audit efforts more important 
and weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between audit quality, and firm performance. 
 In this study, we use a quarterly panel of 89,185 firm observations (15,955 unique firms) 
from 131 countries from July 2018 to December 2020 for 10 quarters. We use a Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) method to estimate the effect of CSR activities and audit quality on firm 
performance during the COVID-19 period. Our findings support the U-shaped relationship 
between CSR activities and firm performance. This relationship is strengthened during COVID-
19. In contrast, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm audit quality (audit fee) 
and firm performance. This relationship is weakened during COVID-19.  
 We make a significant contribution to the theory and practice of maintaining organizational 
legitimacy during the pandemic. First, we add to the strategic legitimacy perspective by showing 
that firms can adopt strategies like CSR activities and high audit quality to gain legitimacy and 
increase firm value during the COVID-19 period. Second, we add to mixed literature on the 
relationship between CSR activities and firm performance. We show that the relationship between 
CSR activities and firm performance is non-linear. Third, we contribute to the literature on the 
relationship between audit quality and firm performance. Our findings show that up to an extent 
audit fees improve firm performance by increasing high-quality disclosure and reducing 
information between the firm and shareholders. A very higher level of audit fee indicates high firm 
risk, an agency relationship between firm and auditors, and compromise auditors independence. 
This reduces firm legitimacy and subsequently firm value.  
2. Theory and hypotheses development 
2.1 Organizational legitimacy perspective 
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Extant literature has used institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987), and 
strategic theories (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995) to explain an organization's 
legitimacy management. Institutional theory predicts organizational legitimacy as an outcome of 
following widely maintained firm characteristics and normative assumptions of institutions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987). Under the logic of institutional legitimacy firms have 
limited capability to manage the institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), because firms follow 
"a continuous and often unconscious adaptation process in which the organization reacts to 
external expectations" (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). In contrast, the strategic approach assumes 
that organizational legitimacy treat is directly influenced and managed by firms (Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990) as an operational resource (Suchman, 1995). Firms get institutional support by 
instrumentally deploying and manipulating the redolent symbols (Suchman, 1995). The current 
COVID-19 pandemic situation as a worldwide crisis provides firms with the opportunity to 
purposively maintain organizational legitimacy. Firms take purposive legitimization actions based 
on managerial calculations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
   The COVID-19 pandemic context may cause stakeholders to reject firm practices such as 
lower level of CSR practices and audit quality, if they perceive these practices as merely 
reputational gaining stunts to increase firms value. In the current COVID-19 pandemic context, 
firms deliberately communicate their rational argument about specific practices to gain legitimacy. 
Based on the above discussed theoretical argument, we examine whether firms' practices of high 
CSR activities and audit quality increase firms' legitimacy to gain organizational value during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
2.2 CSR and firm performance 
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Firms are always under pressure to maximize shareholders' wealth as well as stakeholder's welfare. 
Firms’ concern for institutional legitimacy forces to adopt CSR practices (Bansal and Clelland, 
2004; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009) to improve firm reputation and access to resources 
(Christmann and Taylor, 2001). Existing literature is not able to resolve the relationship between 
CSR activities and firm performance. Some of the studies find CSR as a value-enhancing activity 
for the firm (e.g., Cao et al., 2019; Dai et al., 2020; Deng et al., 2013; Flammer, 2015, 2020; Gao 
et al., 2020), while other studies document that it CSR activities can reduce the firm value or even 
not related to firm value (e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, 2010; Cheng et al., 2014; Di Giuli & 
Kostovetsky, 2014; Masulis & Reza, 2015). The conflict resolution view suggests that CSR 
activities enhance firm reputation and value by resolving the conflicts between managers and non-
investing firm stakeholders (Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). The 
overinvestment view suggests that CSR practices are costly to shareholders and managers as agent 
overinvestment shareholders money to gain corporate reputation (e.g., Brammer et al., 2006; 
Crisóstomo et al., 2011; Harjoto & Jo, 2015; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Nelling 
& Webb, 2009). These studies mostly assume a linear relationship between CSR activities and 
firm performance. We argue that this relationship varies with the level of firm CSR activities and 
have different implication in the crisis such as COVID-19. 
 We use institutional legitimacy and organizational legitimacy perspective to establish a 
non-linear relationship between CSR initiatives and firm performance. The current debate on the 
relation between CSR activities and firm strategies to enhance value is based on organizational 
legitimacy which does not adequately define the boundaries in globalized societies (Palazzo and 
Scherer, 2006). The conceptual basis of these arguments is based on getting societal acceptance 
with minimum required efforts (Deegan, 2002; Waddock, 2004). In line with agency arguments in 
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the existing literature (Masulis and Reza, 2015), we argue that shareholders perceive these initial 
lower CSR efforts as firm conformity to societal norms at their cost. The managers take these 
decisions to enhance the firm's reputation rather than increasing firm value. The firms merely 
engage in CSR practices to show a certain level of compliance with social and environmental 
outcomes. Shareholders see these compliance activities as costly affairs. We argue that up to an 
extent firm CSR activities cost shareholders and reduce firm value. 
 We further argue that after an extent firm manager CSR decisions are based on 
organizational strategic legitimacy perspective rather than complying with institutional norms. The 
rational managers' CSR decisions are based on the assumption that firms have strategic capabilities 
to influence and manipulate stakeholders to gain pragmatic legitimacy. The firms seek new forms 
of legitimacy rather than doing taken for granted social and environmentally friendly activities 
(Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). These firms at higher CSR levels even introduce the new domains 
which are traditionally considered state actors responsibilities (Matten and Crane, 2005; Palazzo 
and Scherer, 2006). The rational firm manager takes these extensive CSR decisions to increase 
firm profit or increase the firm value. Based on this discussion, we argue that up to an extent CSR 
activities reduce firms' value but managers' rational decisions of CSR after a level are focused on 
increasing firm value or performance. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H1a. Firm-level of CSR activities have a U-shaped relationship with firm performance. 
 COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the corporate practices and assumptions related to 
CSR activities. Business is seen both as a source as well as an active actor to mitigate societal risk 
during the crisis (Crane and Matten, 2020). Firms are taking heterogeneous responses to the 
COVID-19 crisis. For example, Costco helping employees by increasing the hourly rate by $2, 
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Vodafone helping the customer by providing unlimited mobile data, L'Or ́al supporting suppliers 
by accelerating payments, and LVMH producing hand sanitisers for general community support 
(Bae et al., 2021). In contrast, firms like Marriott International laying off the workforce and 
jeoparding the employee healthcare benefits in the needing hours (Bae et al., 2021). This evidence 
shows that firms follow different approaches to gain legitimacy and survive during COVID-19. 
 COVID-19 pandemic is a truly exogenous event that led to a high level of uncertainty and 
an unprecedented stock market crash within a relatively short period. This exogenous shock results 
from a public health crisis rather than an economic crisis. The subsequent lockdown to protect 
public health caused the stock market crash in the affected regions (Albuquerque et al., 2020). 
This sudden unexpected shock challenged firms' ability to respond on short notice. Firms are under 
the spotlight due to the sudden increase in market participants and government bodies focus on 
CSR activities during the pandemic. We argue that firm initial CSR stunts to overcome legitimacy 
barriers increase agency cost and reduce shareholders returns (Buchanan et al., 2018). The firm 
with higher CSR activities with limited financial and human resources during a pandemic is 
perceived more legitimate and valued higher by shareholders. Firms with higher CSR efforts also 
attract socially responsible investors(SRIs). SRIs are more resilient to COVID-19 shock compared 
to other investors (Albuquerque et al., 2020). SRIs are also less sensitive to short-term firm 
performance losses (Bollen, 2007; Renneboog et al., 2011), and hold stable firm value during 
COVID-19. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1b. The U-shaped relationship between CSR activities and firm performance is strengthened 
during COVID-19. 
2.3 Audit quality and firm performance 
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The Enron bankruptcy in 2001 and Arthur Andersen collapsed in 2002 questioned the auditing 
quality of firms. The role of external auditors becomes important in a public firm with separation 
of ownership and control (Francis, 2004). In this study, we focus on the audit fee as a measure of 
audit quality effort by firms. The relationship between audit fee and firm performance is also 
puzzled.  The audit fee reflects both the cost of auditing and audit quality. Some studies find that 
higher audit fees improve firm performance as it is considered as a signal of audit quality (Bell et 
al., 2008; Martinez and da Jesus Moraes, 2014; Stanley, 2011).  Others find that higher audit fees 
is a signal of firm risk and it reduces firm performance (Moutinho et al., 2012). We propose a 
contextual non-linear relationship between audit fees and firm performance.  
 Firms' actual audit fees consist of normal fees and abnormal fees due to the idiosyncratic 
relationship between firm and auditor. Normal audit fee reflects auditors effort (Choi et al., 2008, 
2009; Simunic, 1980), but above a level, normal audit fee also reflects auditor-client specific 
relations (Higgs and Skantz, 2006). Audit fees as a proxy of audit quality reflect more audit efforts 
in a closely regulated market with the limited opportunity of earning rents (Hoitash, 2011; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Yuniarti, 2011). Audit fee shows audit process efforts with specialized 
staff and more audit hours (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002). Higher audit fees also signal that firms 
have hired big auditors with more skill, expertise, and experience. This enhances the legitimacy of 
a firm's disclosure and reporting to increase firm value.  
 Further, we argue that audit fees beyond a level may negatively influence firm value. As 
per auditing pricing theory and literature on abnormally high audit fees  (Asthana & Boone, 2012; 
Choi et al., 2010) a very high audit fee reflects firm business risk. Abnormally high audit fee 
indicates financial reporting problems (Hribar et al., 2014), and reduce firm performance (Picconi 
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and Reynolds, 2013; Stanley, 2011). A very high audit fee also shows agency relationship between 
firm manager and auditing firm and reduce auditor independence. A very high audit fee benefits 
are surpassed by the cost of substandard reporting due to idiosyncratic relationships. A very high 
audit fee also shows agency relationship between firm manager and auditing firm and reduce 
auditor independence. This reduces firm auditing process legitimacy and subsequently reduces 
firm value. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2a. Audit fee has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance. 
 The firms’ performance is negatively impacted by COVID-19 due to high uncertainty in 
financial and economic conditions, supply and demand shock due to lockdown imposed by various 
country governments (Ozili and Arun, 2020). Prior literature suggests that economic crises 
negatively impact firm accounting management and reporting practices (Huizinga and Laeven, 
2012, 2012; Peterson and Arun, 2018). Firms engage in malpractices of miscommunicating with 
shareholders to gain legitimacy during the crisis. Firms follow earnings smoothing practices 
(Peterson and Arun, 2018), and distort financial reporting during the crises (Huizinga and Laeven, 
2012). This makes the role of audit quality more important and firms with higher audit fees are 
perceived to be more legitimate. We argue that during the COVID-19 crisis the firm with lower 
audit fees is perceived less legitimate compared to firms with high audit fees. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H2b. The inverted U-shaped relationship between audit fee and firm performance is weakened 
during COVID-19. 
3. Data and methodology 
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3.1 Analytical method 
We use a DiD method to examine the proposed hypotheses (Goodman-Bacon and Marcus, 2020). 
We employ the following equation in our study: Yj,t =  β0 + β1Xj ∗ COVID − 19t + Zj,t−1 + Countryc,q + γi,q + εj + ϵj,t 
where Y represents Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance.  Our main independent variables 
are Xj* COVID-19 where X equals CSR activities score and audit quality of the firm along with 
their squared terms. COVID-19 was declared as a pandemic by World Health Organisation in 
March 2020. We refer to April 2020- December 2020 as the post-COVID-19 period. Accordingly, 
COVID-19 equals 1 for the post-pandemic declaration period and 0 otherwise. Z represents a 
vector of firm-level control variables which includes size, sales growth, liquidity, leverage, 
profitability, and age (log age) of the firm. Country represents a vector of country-specific control 
variables that includes export GDP per capita and GDP growth.  We winsorize all these variables 
at the 1st and 95th percentile to remove possible outliers in the sample. We take the lagged value 
by one-quarter of all the variables to control for the potential endogeneity concerns. The primary 
independent variables (CSR activities and audit quality) are available annually, we use one year 
lag of these variables for respective quarters. 
  γi,q represents industry-quarter fixed effects to control for any time-variant industry-
specific variations. εj represents firm-fixed effects that control for any firm-specific heterogeneity. 
As an alternative measure, we also include country-quarter interactive fixed effects. This dummy 
controls for any time-variant country-specific changes. These interactive fixed-effects help in 
controlling any unobserved heterogeneity in the market performance of the firms (Gormley and 
Matsa, 2014). These fixed effects also minimize the issues related to omitted variables and 
endogeneity.  
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3.2 Data description 
We employ a quarterly panel of 89,185 firm-quarter observations (15,955 unique firms) from 131 
countries from July 2018 to December 2020 for 10 quarters. We use the Refinitiv Eikon database 
for obtaining all the firm-level variables used in our study. Country-level variables are obtained 
from the world bank database. The dependent variable of our study is firm performance, which is 
being measured by Tobin's Q. It is defined as the ratio of the sum of equity and total liability to 
the total assets of the firm. Tobin’s Q is used as a market-based performance measure of the firm 
(Kao et al., 2018; Ting, 2021). 
 Our main independent variables are CSR activities and the audit quality of the firm. CSR 
activities are measured using the ESG score of the firm. Here, the ESG score is based on the firm's 
environmental (impact on living and non-living natural systems), social (capacity to generate 
loyalty and trust) and governance pillar (activities to act in the best interest of shareholders) (Ding 
et al., 2016). The higher the ESG score of the firm, the higher the firm is involved in CSR activities. 
The other independent variable, audit quality, is measured using the logarithm of audit fees paid 
by a firm (Saeed et al., 2020). It is used as a proxy for demand for high-quality audits.  
 We control for various firm-level variables. Firm size is measured using the logarithm of 
total assets. Sales growth is defined as the change in sales. We use the quick ratio of the firm as a 
proxy for liquidity in our sample. Leverage is measured as the ratio of debt to equity. Profitability 
equals the return on assets (ROA) and age equals the logarithm of the age of the firm in years. 
Table I describes the measurement or variables with appropriate references and data sources.  
--------------------------------------------- 




Table II shows the summary statistics of the key variables used in our study. The mean value of 
Tobin's Q per cent is 99.57 which shows that most of the firms in our sample have the market 
value that reflects the recorded assets of the firm. The minimum value of Audit quality is 7.91 and 
the maximum value is 15.19 which shows that firms are paying both low and high audit fees in the 
sample. The average size of firms in our sample is 11.84. ESG score of firms included in the 
sample has a high standard deviation of  20.17. Our sample is dominated by firms with low 
liquidity as the 75th percentile value of the Quick ratio is 2.22 and the maximum value is 8.75. The 
average profitability of firms is -0.13. The average change in the age of the firms is 2.82. Export 
GDP has a high standard deviation of 26.07. GDP growth of countries included in the sample 
ranges from 0.15 to 7.02. Table III shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in the study. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table II and Table III about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 Table IV shows regression results of CSR activities impact on firm performance. Model-1 
is the null model with all the control variables. Model-2 shows that CSR activities have a 
significant negative ( = -0.019 , p-value < 0.05) effect on firm performance and squared term of 
CSR activities has a significant positive ( = 0.001 , p-value <0.05 ) effect on firm performance. 
This supports our hypothesis 1a, which predicts a U-shaped relationship between CSR activities 
and firm performance. The results of Model-3 show that interaction between CSR activities and 
COVID-19 has significant positive ( = -0.017, p-value < 0.05) impact on firm performance. 
Model-3 also shows that the interaction between the squared term of CSR activities and COVID-
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19 has a significant negative ( = 0.001, p-value <0.05) impact on firm performance. These results 
support our hypothesis 1b, which predicts the positive moderating effect of COVID-19 on the 
relationship between CSR activities and firm performance. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table IV about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 Table V shows regression results of audit quality impact on firm performance. The results 
in Model-1 show that audit quality has a significant positive ( = 0.212, p-value <0.05 ) impact on 
firm performance, and squared of audit quality has a significant negative ( = -0.009 , p-value < 
0.05) impact on firm performance. This supports our hypothesis 2a, which predicts an inverted U-
shaped relationship between audit quality and firm performance. The results of Model-2 show that 
the interaction between audit quality and COVID-19 has a significant negative ( = -0.251, p-value 
< 0.10) impact on firm performance. Model-2 also shows that the interaction between the squared 
term of audit quality and COVID-19 have a significant positive ( = 0.011, p-value < 0.10) impact 
on firm performance. These results support our hypothesis 1b, which predicts the negative 
moderating effect of COVID-19 on the relationship between CSR activities and firm performance. 
--------------------------------------------- 




This study shows that firms use CSR activities and audit quality as a resource of legitimacy. These 
strategies have become more important during the COVID-19 crisis. Prior studies on the 
relationship between CSR activities and firm performance during COVID-19 show mixed 
evidence. Some of the studies find a positive impact of firm CSR orientation on a stock return 
during COVID-19, while others reported no significant impact (Bae et al., 2021; Demers et al., 
2021). These studies are limited to firm stock return during the COVID-19 period only and assume 
a linear relationship between CSR activities and firm value. Our study provides evidence that CSR 
activities and firm value do not have a linear relationship. We find that CSR activities have a U-
shaped relationship with firm market-based performance. The initial level of firms’ CSR activities 
efforts is the effort to confirm with institutional norms and cost the shareholder. Beyond a level, 
the CSR activities are undertaken by the firms’ managers to gain strategic legitimacy and improve 
firms’ performance. Firms showing higher commitment to CSR activities with limited financial 
and human resources during COVID-19 are perceived more legitimate by the shareholders. The 
COVID-19 crisis strengthens the relationship between CSR activities and firm performance. 
 Audit quality measured using audit fee shows firm effort to produce quality reports and 
communication to stakeholders with lower malpractices. We find that up to a level audit fee reflects 
firm auditing efforts of hiring experienced, qualified, and reputed auditors and improves firm 
performance. Audit fee beyond a level reflects an idiosyncratic firm-auditor relationship with 
compromised audit quality and shows high firm risk. We find support for an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between audit quality and firm performance. Furthermore, given the high risk of 
distress during COVID-19, it is likely that the firms violate the debt contracts (Albitar et al., 2020), 
and follow earning smoothing practices. This demands increased assurance for investors to 
increase their confidence through audit quality (Arthur et al., 2015). Our results show that an 
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inverted U-shaped relationship between audit quality and firm performance is weakened during 
COVID-19. This shows that during a crisis high audit efforts are valued more compared to lower 
audit efforts. 
5.1 Theoretical and managerial implications 
First, we add to the strategic legitimacy perspective by showing that firms can adopt strategies like 
CSR activities and high audit quality to gain legitimacy and increase firm value during a crisis 
such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, we add to mixed literature on the relationship between 
CSR activities and firm performance. We show that the relationship between CSR activities and 
firm performance is non-linear. Beyond an optimal level, the CSR decisions are focused on 
increasing firm strategic capabilities to influence and manipulate stakeholders to gain pragmatic 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Third, we contribute to the literature on the relationship between 
audit quality and firm performance. Our findings show that up to an extent audit fees improve firm 
performance by increasing high-quality disclosure and reducing information between the firm and 
shareholders. A very higher level of audit fee indicates high firm risk, an agency relationship 
between firm and auditors, and compromise auditors independence. This reduces firm legitimacy 
and subsequently firm value. 
 Finally, we suggest managers focus on firm temporal strategies to overcome the challenges 
from the COVID-19 pandemic (Shi and Prescott, 2012). The manager needs to shift their focus 
from cost to time orientation. During the crisis, managers need to focus on strategies increasing 
firm value for the time period. This study shows that firm temporal legitimacy gaining practices 
such as CSR activities and audit quality provides an opportunity to increase firm value. The firm 
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manager also needs to identify the optimal level of CSR activities and audit fees to balance the 
cost of agency and the benefits of legitimacy. 
 This study is limited to CSR activities and audit quality as legitimacy maintaining strategies 
during COVID-19. Future studies can explore other strategies such as earnings management and 
corporate investment decisions. Future studies can extend this study by taking institutional context 
as a moderating factor on the relationship between CSR activities, audit quality, and firm 
performance. The country-specific formal institution's development and informal institutions may 
significantly vary our findings. 
6. Conclusion 
We use a quarterly panel of 89,185 firm-quarter observations from 131 countries to estimate the 
impact of CSR activities and audit quality on firm performance during the COVID-19 period. We 
find a U-shaped relationship between CSR activities and firm performance during COVID-19. The 
higher CSR activities are undertaken by the firms’ managers to gain strategic legitimacy and 
improve firms’ performance. In contrast, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm 
audit quality and firm performance after the declaration of COVID-19 as the pandemic. The high 
audit efforts are valued more compared to lower audit efforts during the COVID-19 period. Our 
study makes significant contributions to theory and practice on maintaining organizational 
legitimacy during the pandemic. The managers need to focus on strategies increasing firm value 
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Table I. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Description Data Source Reference 
Tobin’s Q Equals ratio of the sum of equity 
and total liability to total assets of 
the firm 
Refinitiv Eikon Kao et al., (2018) 
CSR Equals the ESG score of a 
company based on the 
environmental(E), social(S), and 
governance(G)  scores in the 
previous year 
Refinitiv Eikon Ding et al. (2016) 
Audit Quality Equals logarithm of audit fees 
paid by a firm in the previous year 
Refinitiv Eikon Saeed et al. (2020) 
Size Equals the logarithm of total 
assets of the firm 
Refinitiv Eikon Saeed et al. (2020) 
Sales growth Equals the change in sales of the 
firm 
Refinitiv Eikon Ding et al. (2016) 
Liquidity Equals quick ratio of the firm Refinitiv Eikon Boodoo, (2016) 
Leverage  Equals debt-to-equity ratio of the 
firm 
Refinitiv Eikon Suto & Takehara, (2017) 
Profitability Equals return on assets of the firm Refinitiv Eikon Saeed et al. (2020) 
Log age Equals the logarithm of the age of 
the firm in years 
Refinitiv Eikon Saeidi et al. (2015) 
Export GDP Equals ratio of export to GDP of a 
country 
World Bank Maksimovic, (2001) 
GDP growth Equals growth in GDP of a 
country relative to the previous 
year 






















Table II. Summary statistics of key variables used in the study 
Variable                      N Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Tobin’s Q 255444 99.57 3.32 69.78 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Audit Quality 165794 12.32 1.56 7.91 10.42 11.40 12.28 13.33 
Audit Quality2 165794 154.32 38.09 62.56 108.52 130.05 150.68 177.66 
CSR 49530 42.06 20.18 5.22 16.40 25.51 40.30 58.09 
CSR2 49530 2176.23 1813.99 27.26 268.87 650.51 1624.44 3374.63 
COVID-19 437580 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Size 230861 11.85 2.51 4.36 8.60 10.26 12.00 13.64 
Sales growth 183999 0.04 0.40 -0.99 -0.39 -0.14 0.00 0.16 
Liquidity 222927 1.94 2.18 0.00 0.24 0.63 1.17 2.22 
Leverage 230031 0.36 1.49 -10.13 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.82 
Profitability 211662 -0.14 0.70 -5.89 -0.17 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
Log age 348886 2.82 0.83 0.00 1.79 2.48 2.94 3.40 
Export GDP 418080 33.52 26.07 10.12 12.17 18.41 21.21 38.44 
GDP growth 435678 3.42 2.13 0.15 0.73 1.93 2.93 5.56 
Notes: The description of all the variables in given in Table I. N represents the number of observations. Min and Max represent 
the minimum and maximum observations respectively. SD and P denote standard deviation and percentile respectively.  
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Table III. Correlation table 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Tobin's Q 1            
2 Audit quality -0.12*** 1           
3 CSR -0.17*** 0.38*** 1          
4 COVID-19 0.01 0.02* 0.03*** 1         
5 Size -0.15*** 0.46*** 0.51*** -0.03*** 1        
6 Sales growth 0.01 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02** -0.03*** 1       
7 Liquidity 0.04*** -0.21*** -0.27*** 0.05*** -0.42*** 0.06*** 1      
8 Leverage -0.02* 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10*** -0.01 -0.06*** 1     
9 Profitability -0.04*** 0.09*** 0.17*** -0.11*** 0.35*** 0.07*** -0.21*** 0.03*** 1    
10 Log age 0.04*** 0.01 0.14*** -0.03*** 0.09*** -0.01 -0.06*** 0.03*** 0.13*** 1   
11 Export GDP -0.04*** -0.13*** 0.24*** -0.02 0.14*** -0.02* -0.11*** 0.02*** 0.06*** -0.04*** 1  
12 GDP growth -0.01 -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 0.10*** 0.02* -0.03*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 1 
Notes: *, **, *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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Table IV. Regression results of CSR and firm performance 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
CSR  -0.019** -0.008  -0.017** -0.006 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008) 
CSR2  0.001** 0.001  0.001* 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
COVID-19   0.219**   0.205** 
   (0.088)   (0.087) 
CSR x COVID-19   -0.017**   -0.016** 
   (0.007)   (0.007) 
CSR2 x COVID-19   0.001**   0.002** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Size 0.001 0.020 0.053*** 0.003 0.023 0.055*** 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.019) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) 
Sales growth -0.007* -0.018 -0.016 -0.006 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) 
Liquidity -0.001 -0.014 -0.014 -0.001 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Profitability -0.063 -0.616** -0.619** -0.063 -0.625** -0.628** 
 (0.072) (0.299) (0.299) (0.072) (0.301) (0.300) 
Log Age 0.026 0.173 0.199 0.022 0.163 0.189 
 (0.144) (0.448) (0.457) (0.127) (0.416) (0.423) 
Export GDP 0.000 0.003 -0.001    
 (0.002) (0.023) (0.023)    
GDP growth 0.002 0.022 0.026    
 (0.004) (0.044) (0.044)    
Constant 99.782*** 99.025*** 98.394*** 99.786*** 99.075*** 98.359*** 
 (0.373) (1.153) (1.315) (0.342) (1.123) (1.283) 
              
Observations 89,185 19,922 19,922 94,371 20,292 20,292 
Industry-Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Quarter fixed effects No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.013 
N 15,955 2,986 2,986 16,112 3,008 3,008 
Notes: The description of all the variables in given in Table I. The dependent variable in all the models is the percentage of Tobin’s 
Q. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Model (1) -(3) show the results with country-level variables and model (4)-(6) show 
the results with Country-quarter fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance 










Table V. Regression results of Audit Quality and firm performance 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Audit Quality 0.212** 0.326** 0.184* 0.302** 
 (0.108) (0.133) (0.095) (0.121) 
Audit Quality2 -0.009** -0.014** -0.008** -0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
COVID-19  1.474  1.387 
  (0.897)  (0.845) 
Audit Quality x COVID-19  -0.251*  -0.237* 
  (0.152)  (0.143) 
Audit Quality2 x COVID-19  0.011*  0.010* 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Size -0.010 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
Sales growth -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Liquidity -0.007** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Profitability -0.030 -0.028 -0.030 -0.029 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Log Age 0.106 0.085 0.097 0.070 
 (0.272) (0.268) (0.226) (0.221) 
Export GDP 0.014 0.012   
 (0.011) (0.012)   
GDP growth -0.003 0.001   
 (0.007) (0.007)   
Constant 98.210*** 97.551*** 98.716*** 97.991*** 
 (0.907) (1.041) (0.809) (0.990) 
          
Observations 46,183 46,183 50,236 50,236 
Industry-Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Quarter fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.007 
N 8,754 8,754 9,180 9,180 
Notes: The description of all the variables is given in Table I. The dependent variable in all the models is the percentage of Tobin's 
Q. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Model (1) -(2) show the results with country-level variables and model (3)-(4) 
show the results with Country-quarter fixed effects.  The standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
 
 
